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Abstract
Recent research on payments for environmental services (PES) has observed that high transaction costs (TCs) are
incurred through the implementation of PES schemes and farmer participation. TCs incurred by households are
considered to be an obstacle to the participation in and efficiency of PES policies. This study aims to understand
transactions related to previous forest plantation programmes and to estimate the actual TCs incurred by farmers who
participated in these programmes in a mountainous area of northwestern Vietnam. In addition, this study examines
determinants of households’ TCs to test the hypothesis of whether the amount of TCs varies according to household
characteristics. Results show that average TCs are not likely to be a constraint for participation since they are about
200,000 VND (USD 10) per household per contract, which is equivalent to one person’s average earnings for about
two days of labour. However, TCs amount to more than one-third of the programmes’ benefits, which is relatively
high compared to PES programmes in developed countries. This implies that rather than aiming to reduce TCs, an
appropriate agenda for policy improvement is to balance the level of TCs with PES programme benefits to enhance the
overall attractiveness of afforestation programmes for smallholder farmers. Regression analysis reveals that education,
gender and perception towards PES programmes have significant effects on the magnitude of TCs. The analyses also
points out the importance of local conditions on the level of TCs, with some unexpected results.
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1 Introduction
Recent research on payments for environmental ser-
vices (PES) has observed that high transaction costs
(TCs) are incurred through the implementation of PES
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schemes and farmer participation (e.g., FAO, 2007;
Dunn, 2011; To et al., 2012). TCs incurred in setting up
and managing PES schemes are central to their sustain-
ability. Many studies have reported that TCs are a sig-
nificant factor in farmers’ decision to participate. Some
studies find that for the participation of poor households
in PES schemes, higher TCs are likely to be greater ob-
stacles than the household’s own capacity and resources
(Behera & Engel, 2004; Engel et al., 2008; Locatelli
et al., 2008; Wunder, 2008). Several studies find that
participation decisions are highly influenced by fixed
TCs (Goetz, 1992; Kranton, 1996; Key et al., 2000;
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Ouma et al., 2010). Omano (1998) shows that tension
between TCs and participation in specialised farming
may contribute to smallholder’s disregard for more in-
come through greater specialisation. Studies on agri-
environmental schemes (AES)1 also claim that TCs mat-
ter for farmers’ decision to participate in such schemes
(Falconer, 2000; Van Huylenbroeck et al., 2005; Mette-
penningen et al., 2009). The concern over households’
TCs is also related to the efficiency of the implementa-
tion of agricultural policies (e.g., Buchli & Flury, 2005;
Rørstad et al., 2007) and nature conservation practises
(e.g., Falconer & Saunders, 2002; Mburu et al., 2003).
High TCs, which can be an obstacle to farmers’ par-
ticipation in and the efficiency of PES programmes, is
acknowledged by the European Commission who im-
plemented compensation of TCs in calculating agri-
environmental payments in 2005. To minimise poten-
tial constraints from high TCs through participation in
PES schemes and to improve programme efficiency, it
is important to calculate actual TCs incurred by farmers.
However, few studies have empirically estimated farm-
ers’ TCs (Falconer, 2000; Falconer & Saunders, 2002;
Vatn et al., 2002; Mburu et al., 2003; Buchli & Flury,
2005; Rørstad et al., 2007; Mettepenningen et al., 2009).
Instead, most studies tend to observe patterns of partici-
pation without determining which factors cause partici-
pation or non-participation (Engel et al., 2008).
This article contributes to the literature on PES by
investigating TCs incurred by smallholder farmers who
participated in forest management schemes in a moun-
tainous area of northwestern Vietnam. In September
2010, the Government of Vietnam decreed the policy of
payment for forest environmental services, which paid
service providers for forest protection activity. Previ-
ous studies on TCs in past forest management schemes
have had policy implications for PES implementation
and the design of future PES regulations and guidelines.
Our study aims to understand the processes and trans-
actions related to past forest plantation programmes and
to estimate TCs incurred by farmers who participated
in these programmes. In addition, as recommendations
in current studies to reduce TCs have been biased to-
ward the adoption of community-based management as
a cost-saving alternative (e.g., Meshack et al., 2006; Jin-
dal & Kerr, 2007), we aim to understand differences
in TCs between individual and community-based forest
management through a literature review and key stake-
holder interviews. Another objective of this study is to
1AES is based on long-term, voluntary contracts between farmers
and the government, specifying compensation payments for certain
environmental management responsibilities.
examine determinants of household TCs to test whether
the amount of TCs vary according to household charac-
teristics. There are only a handful of studies that have
empirically investigated factors determining the level of
TCs of farmers’ participation in forest management pro-
grammes (e.g., Adhikari & Lovett, 2006; Arifin, 2006;
Meshack et al., 2006).
2 Study area
The study area is the mountainous district of Da Bac,
the largest district in Hoa Binh province. The district
is located in northwestern Vietnam, with the highest al-
titude reaching 560 meters above sea level. The study
area has diversified economic activities given its prox-
imity to Ha Noi, which is about 100 km away, and its
varied geographical conditions since the southern part
of the district is adjacent to the Hoa Binh reservoir and
the northern part is steep and mountainous. Forest occu-
pies about two-thirds of the district, with natural forest
accounting for 39 % and production forest 2 for 28 % of
the total area. In Da Bac district, forest land has been
allocated to individual households since 1994 according
to the 1993 Land Law (Tran et al., 2013). Households
receive a land use certificate, also known as a ’Redbook’
given its appearance, as proof that its holder has the legal
rights to exchange, transfer, lease, inherit and mortgage
the land use right to the designated land for the purpose
of forestry for 50 years.
2.1 Forest plantation support programmes
In the past, several government programmes have
been implemented to provide support for forest plan-
tation, even though the main purposes of these pro-
grammes differ. The programme that is the most well-
known and had the most participants is a resettlement
programme, known as Programme 747, for households
that were resettled from the Hoa Binh dam construc-
tion site and its reservoir area. Although a main goal of
this programme was to stabilise socio-economic devel-
opment for resettled households, the support of forest
plantation was another element. In particular, invest-
ment in fast growing trees, such as bamboo, was sup-
ported by the provision of bamboo seedlings and cash
2According to the Law on Forest Protection and Development is-
sued in 2004, forests in Vietnam are classified into three types based
on their major use purpose: production, protection and special use.
Production forests are mainly used for production and trading of tim-
ber and non-timber forest products in combination with environmental
protection (FAOLEX, 2005). Production forests do not have restric-
tions on the volume of timber harvested, whereas protection and spe-
cial use forests have restrictions on the volume of timber harvested.
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to compensate labour costs for three years. The amount
of support varied by commune. The programme also
provided training on techniques of tree plantation and
maintenance.
Another important programme is the Five-Million-
Hectare-Reforestation Programme (also known as Pro-
gramme 661), which had a main goal of supporting for-
est plantation at the national level. The programme
began in 1998 after the start of Programme 747, and
initially offered loans to companies for reforestation
with the purpose of forest protection. The programme
evolved to include direct support to forest plantations es-
tablished by households since 2006 (Sikor, 2011). The
programme was planned and implemented through sev-
eral hundred local projects designed and carried out
by localities after being approved by higher level au-
thorities. The government provided a broad framework
and indicated a set of policies. Thus, local authorities
were given a high degree of freedom to design activities
(MARD, 2000).
Households in the study area have received support
from Programme 661 through projects executed by the
district-level Office of Agriculture and Rural Develop-
ment and State Forest Enterprise (SFE). For individual
farmers, there are two types of support according to the
purpose of forest plantation, protection and production.
Our analysis focuses only on the production component
of the programme, which provided tree seedlings and
cash as compensation for labour. The forestry depart-
ment at the provincial level specified the type of trees
and technical design of the plantation, such as the num-
ber of trees per hectare and the distance between each
tree. The programme provided support mainly for Aca-
cia and other slow growing trees. The maximum sup-
port per hectare was 2 to 3 million VND (approximately,
USD 95 to 144), depending on the type of seedling. The
allocation of support can be divided into seedling and
labour costs which were granted to farmers directly, and
administrative costs. The compensation for labour was
not fixed, but instead was contingent on the quality and
survival rate of the planted trees. In a worst case sce-
nario, farmers would not receive any compensation for
labour if the percentage of tree cover was less than 50 %
of the designated number of trees per hectare. If farmers
maintained the trees well with more than 85 % of cover-
age, farmers received the full amount of labour compen-
sation one year after the start of the contract. In addition
to these two main programmes, there were other forest
plantation programmes implemented in the study area;
however, because only a few households participated in
these programmes, they are not considered in this study.
3 Methodology
3.1 Conceptual framework
Transaction costs are originally defined by Coase
(1960) as the costs of carrying out a transaction by
means of an exchange on the open market. However,
in order to conduct an empirical analysis of private TCs
from forest plantation programmes, we adapt this defi-
nition and define TCs as costs arising from the organi-
sation of the transfer of goods and services between two
agents. We focus on the transfer of support (material,
cash, etc.) from the government in exchange for forest
cover provided by farmers. Literature on private TCs
distinguishes three categories (e.g., Mburu et al., 2003;
Van Huylenbroeck et al., 2005; Mettepenningen et al.,
2009). The first category of TCs consists of search and
information costs, which arise ex-ante to the transaction
and include the costs of looking for information for for-
est plantation programmes and costs related to making
the decision to join a programme. The second category
is ex-ante negotiation costs, or in our case, application
costs since real negotiation on contract terms between
the government and farmers does not exist in the pro-
gramme. Application costs cover the costs of fulfilling
preliminary conditions to be able to participate in the
programme, such as contacting government officers or
participating in specific training. The third category of
TCs occur ex-post to the transaction and comprise of
costs that farmers incur as a result of monitoring and
enforcement required by the government, such as ac-
companying control officers to the field when the forest
needs to be inspected.
According to Williamson (1996), apart from the be-
haviour of farmers and the institutional arrangement in
which the transaction takes place, the level of TCs also
depends on the transaction’s attributes. These attributes
include asset specificity, uncertainty and transaction fre-
quency. Asset specificity is defined as the degree to
which an asset can be redeployed to alternative uses
and by alternative users without sacrificing productive
value: higher levels of asset specificity imply higher
TCs (Williamson, 1996). The level of asset specificity
of a forest plantation programme can be evaluated based
on its sources of asset specificity, namely site speci-
ficity, temporal specificity, specific physical assets, hu-
man capital, brand name specificity and dedicated as-
sets (Williamson, 1996). TCs are increased by high un-
certainty due to unanticipated changes in the environ-
ment and opportunistic behaviour from one of the part-
ners (Van Huylenbroeck et al., 2005). Lastly, TCs are
reduced if transactions are repeated over time because
of reduced efforts to search for information, as well as
202 A. Manasboonphempool et al. / J. Agr. Rural Develop. Trop. Subtrop. 116 - 2 (2015) 199–211
Fig. 1: Conceptual framework
Source: Authors
to apply and monitor (Mettepenningen & Van Huylen-
broeck, 2009). Figure 1 shows the conceptual frame-
work of the study.
3.2 Sampling and data collection
Two survey rounds were conducted from November
to December 2011 and from August to September 2012
in Da Bac district, Hoa Binh province. A two-stage clus-
ter sampling procedure was employed. In the first stage,
20 villages were randomly selected using the Probabil-
ity Proportionate to Size method (Carletto, 1999). In
the second stage, 15 households were randomly selected
in each of the previously selected villages using village
level household lists. There were two villages that did
not have a list, so the random walk method (Henry et al.,
2003) was used to select households in these villages. In
total, the dataset consists of 300 households and is rep-
resentative at the district and village levels. Apart from
questions about the amount of time and money spent on
each transaction, as well as benefits and perceptions to-
wards forest plantation programmes, the questionnaire
covered a wide range of topics, such as demographic
and socio-economic information, social capital indica-
tors, land use, land tenure, agricultural production and
forest plantation activities.
Before analysing TCs, we examined transactions for
each household who participated in a forest plantation
programme. Household heads were asked about the
most recent programmes they participated in, since de-
tails on transactions are easier to recall and therefore
data are more reliable and complete. Respondents were
asked about the activities they had done related to par-
ticipation in the programme and the amount of time and
money spent for each activity. These activities can be
clearly distinguished from production activities, such as
tree planting and maintaining processes. These ques-
tions were about activities specific to forest plantation
programmes and were activities that would not have oc-
curred in the absence of forest plantation programmes.
A list of activities was generated from focus group dis-
cussions in villages that were not included in the sam-
ple villages. Participants in the focus group discussions
were selected by village heads who were instructed to
ensure that the group comprised of varying genders and
ages. Activities were then categorised into the three
types mentioned above. The first type of activity is the
search and information gathering activity, which con-
sists of participation in village meetings by household
heads or household representatives to obtain informa-
tion about the programme, decision making process and
any other activities before signing the contract. 3 The
second type of activity comprises of application activi-
ties, including contract signing, learning about the tech-
nical aspects of tree growing, attending trainings and re-
ceiving tree seedlings. The last type of activities com-
prises of monitoring and enforcement activities, which
consists of accompanying officers to evaluate the plot
during the forest establishment period (weeding, prepar-
ing the land and planting trees), maintenance period and
the period until payments have been received, as well as
transactions that occur when farmers receive payments.
One challenge of estimating private TCs is the mon-
etisation of time inputs reported by farmers. Studies
that estimate private TCs have used the opportunity cost
of labour, such as the market wage rate (e.g., Mburu
et al., 2003; Buchli & Flury, 2005; Mettepenningen &
3The term ’signing the contract’ in this case indicates the action
where participants give their signatures to the officers when they re-
ceive the tree seedlings.
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Van Huylenbroeck, 2009) or household farm income
(Falconer & Saunders, 2002); however, wage rates for
labour in rural areas in many developing countries may
not accurately reflect the opportunity cost of labour be-
cause the labour market is not perfectly competitive
(Gittinger, 1984). Given the data limitation on the op-
portunity cost of labour and employment opportunities,
we use the district’s average wage rate multiplied by
the reported time and adjusted with the possibilities of
working outside of the farm. In the study area, opportu-
nities of working outside the farm are not the same for
each farmer since such opportunities depend on the lo-
cation of the village. For example, it is easier to find
a job, such as at a factory, in villages located closer to
towns. Another factor is the quality of road access to
the village, which is considered to be a barrier for find-
ing a job due to lack of market access, especially for lo-
cal, small-scale businesses (e.g., toothpick production).
Therefore, we adjust the value of TCs based on the as-
sumed varying opportunity costs of labour according to
location and road access. This adjustment is indicated
by conversion factors shown in Table 1. Here, the op-
portunity costs of labour for farmers in remote villages
with poor quality roads are only a fraction of the local
average market wage rate (83,000 VND per day) com-
pared to villages closer to the district centre, where it is
assumed that the opportunity costs of labour are equal to
the district’s average market wage rate. A shortcoming
to this approach is that due to data limitations, the con-
version factor does not take into account other house-
hold characteristics that are relevant to employment op-
portunities. Although conversion factors can be consid-
ered too broad, they can – to some extent – capture dif-
ferences in the opportunity cost of time of households
better than the market wage rate, which was used in pre-
vious studies. Furthermore, sensitivity analysis ensures
the results are not biased according to conversion fac-
tors.
3.3 Estimation strategy
We use regression analysis to investigate whether the
level of TCs differs across households due to house-
hold and programme characteristics, focusing on dif-
ferences in incentives created for participants to bear
TCs. Our regression analysis is limited to Programme
747 and Programme 661 since they are the main pro-
grammes that provide support for forest plantation in the
study area. In addition, because these two programmes
are more recent, households were better able to remem-
ber the details of the programmes’ activities compared
to other programmes. Nevertheless, there are 49 cases
of missing data on household TCs due to the fact that
some respondents could not recall details of activities
undertaken when they had participated in either pro-
gramme. Using analysis of variance (ANOVA), we in-
vestigate whether respondents with missing data on TCs
differ systematically from those who could recall data
on TCs for a number of key socio-economic charac-
teristics, such as education, duration of residence, and
per capita income. We find no significant difference be-
tween the two comparison groups for all variables, in-
dicating that there is no systematic bias in missing re-
sponses. Therefore, we conclude that respondents with
missing information can be dropped from the analysis
without generating biased results (Osborne, 2013).
To examine factors determining the level of TCs in-
curred by households, ordinary least square (OLS) re-
gression is used. The regression model is specified as:
yi = α + X
′
i β + εi ,
where Xi is a vector of explanatory variables determin-
ing the level of TCs and εi is the error term. For the
dependent variable yi, we examine total TCs as well as
different components of TCs, i.e., search and informa-
tion costs, application costs and monitoring and enforce-
ment costs. Total TCs are computed as the sum of fixed
TCs (i.e., TCs that do not vary with the size of the for-
est plantation) and variable TCs (i.e., TCs that increase
with the size of forest plantation, such as the costs of
Table 1: Value of time input by location and road quality factors
Village type Conversion factor Value of time input
Villages near the town (district centre) 1 Labour days of transaction × 83,000 VND
Remote villages with good road access 0.5 Labour days of transaction × 83,000 VND × 0.5
Remote villages with poor road access 0.2 Labour days of transaction × 83,000 VND × 0.2
Source: Authors
Note: The district’s average market wage rate is 83,000 VND per day, which is equivalent to approximately USD 4 (2012 average
exchange rate: USD 1= VND 20,899).
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visiting and inspecting plots which are higher for sev-
eral larger plots compared to one small plot). Explana-
tory variables are selected based on previous studies on
factors influencing private transactions, taking into ac-
count the attributes of the transaction (namely, the con-
ditions of asset specificity, level of uncertainty and fre-
quency), nature of the programmes and local context.
Table 2 presents descriptions of the dependent variable
and explanatory variables, as well as their descriptive
statistics and expected signs. The dependent variable
is the reported TCs of participating in a forest planta-
tion programme. We only consider TCs for the most
Table 2: Variables in the regression analysis and their descriptive statistics




TC Total transaction costs of participating in a forest plantation pro-
gramme (thousand VND/household)
196.8 189.9 NA †
SEARCH Search and information costs of participating in a forest plantation
programme (thousand VND/household)
57.9 66.9 NA
APPLICATION Application costs of participating in a forest plantation pro-
gramme (thousand VND/household)
57.7 72.4 NA





RESIDENCE Duration of household residence in the village (in years) 38.7 13.6 +
MALEHEAD Gender of the household head (male = 1, female = 0) 0.9 0.2 +
EDUC If the household head has a high school certificate
(yes = 1, no = 0)
0.5 0.5 +
ACTIVES Number of non-disabled adults living in the household aged 18–
60
3.2 1.2 +
INCOMEPC Annual household income per capita, excluding income from for-
est (in thousand VND)
6,760.4 7,547.8 +
MEMORG ‡ Number of local organisations in which any household member is
a member of
2.3 1.4 +
TRUST § If the household head in general trusts others in the village
(yes = 1, no = 0)
0.4 0.5 +/−
FORESTAREA Area of forest land per household (square metres) 13,254 13,937 +
FORESTAREASQ Area of forest land squared per household
(million square metres)
369 924 −
DISTANCE Walking time from the house to the closest forest plot (in minutes) 36.9 36.7 +
REDBOOK If the household has a land use certificate for forest land at the
time of plantation (yes = 1, no = 0)
0.5 0.5 +
BENEFICIAL If the household head considers the programme to be beneficial
for the household (yes = 1, no = 0)
0.9 0.3 +
PROG747 If the household participated in Programme 747 (yes=1, no=0) 0.7 0.5 +/−
Source: Own data.
Note: * s.d. = standard deviation; † NA = not applicable; ‡ The local organisations comprise of: (1) mass organisations (e.g., Farmer’s
Union or Women’s Union); (2) agriculture/trade organisation (e.g., cooperative or trader’s association); (3) non-governmental organisation
(NGO) providing services (e.g., an NGO providing an extension service or local credit group); (4) political organisation (e.g., communist
party or people’s committee); and (5) other organisation (e.g., religious group or school committee); § The level of trust is an average based
on responses to the following four statements measured on a Likert scale: (1) Most people in this village are basically honest and can be
trusted; (2) People are interested only in their own welfare; (3) If my household has a problem, there is always someone to help me; and (4)
If you were to lose an animal, someone in the village would help look for it or would return it to you.
A. Manasboonphempool et al. / J. Agr. Rural Develop. Trop. Subtrop. 116 - 2 (2015) 199–211 205
recent programme, even though some households par-
ticipated in several programmes. Since the presence of
heteroscedasticity is detected in the linear model, we use
the log transformation of the dependent variables.
We aim to test whether household demographic char-
acteristics influence the level of TCs (Mburu et al.,
2003; Mettepenningen & Van Huylenbroeck, 2009).
The duration of village residence (RESIDENCE) is hy-
pothesised to have a positive relationship with the level
of TCs, since households who are more settled in the
village tend to participate more in community affairs.
Having a male household head (MALEHEAD) is ex-
pected to entail higher TCs since it is hypothesised that
male household heads tend to have more time to partici-
pate than female household heads in programmes. This
is because female household heads have more respon-
sibilities in the household after working on the farm
and therefore have less time to be involved with pro-
grammes. More educated household heads (EDUC)
tend to contribute more to village meetings and are thus
expected to bear higher TCs. The availability of house-
hold labour (ACTIVES) is hypothesised to have a pos-
itive impact on TCs since household heads are better
able to set aside time for participating in a programme
if there is enough labour in the household. The ef-
fect of wealth (INCOMEPC) is expected to be the same
as the effect of labour availability. Social capital indi-
cators (MEMORG and TRUST) are expected to have
a positive influence on the magnitude of participation
(Mburu et al., 2003). Higher levels of trust among vil-
lagers may reduce TCs from perceiving less of a need to
be active in meetings to protect individual rights and/or
from spending less time on the decision to participate
in the programme because of a lower prospect of fail-
ure, such as from a lower incidence of timber stealing
among villagers. Falconer (2000), Mettepenningen &
Van Huylenbroeck (2009) and Buchli & Flury (2005)
indicate that farm size is an important factor influencing
TCs because of the fixed cost nature of TCs. Therefore,
we hypothesise that farmers with larger areas of forest
plantation (FORESTAREA) tend to bear higher variable
TCs due to the need to spend more time for monitor-
ing and enforcement activities. To examine the vari-
able cost aspect of TCs, the square of forest land area
(FORESTAREASQ) is included in the model to exam-
ine whether total TCs increase or decline at the margin.
Along the same line, the distance between the forest plot
and household (DISTANCE) may increase monitoring
costs, especially if the frequency of monitoring is high.
Farmers with more land tenure security (REDBOOK),
measured by having a forest land use right certificate,
are hypothesised to be more motivated to participate in
the programme and are therefore hypothesised to incur
higher TCs (Mburu et al., 2003). Farmers’ perceptions
that the programme is beneficial may encourage house-
holds to participate more in meetings and may therefore
have a positive relationship with TCs. We also examine
whether Programme 7479 (PROG 747) entails higher
TCs than Programme 661 to test the hypothesis that a
higher frequency of cash distributions leads to higher
TCs incurred by farmers.
4 Results and discussion
4.1 Farmers’ transaction costs of participating in for-
est plantation programmes
We find that household TCs mainly come from the
opportunity cost of time spent on activities related to
the programmes. This can be partially explained by
the decentralised nature of the programmes. The pro-
grammes were implemented at the village level and
therefore farmers did not need to spend money and time
on transportation. The TCs of participating in forest
plantation programmes are reported in Table 3. On aver-
age, the total TCs for participating in a forest plantation
programme is 196,800 VND (USD 9.42)4 per household
per contract. This is relatively low since it is equivalent
to about two days of wage labour (the average wage rate
is 83,000 VND per day). TCs per hectare are 588,300
VND (USD 28.15). To put this in perspective, this is
equivalent to approximately one-tenth of the input costs
for maize cultivation (6 million VND per hectare). The
high standard deviation of TCs, especially for TCs per
hectare, indicates a large variation in TCs across house-
holds. Low TCs can be explained by the low level of
asset specificity of the programmes. The programmes
have small site and temporal specificity since planting
forest in our study area can be easily replaced by other
agricultural activities, such as growing maize or cas-
sava. The programmes do not require specific human
capital since farmers do not need to invest much time
learning or attending training sessions on forest planta-
tion techniques. In addition, participants are not obliged
to invest in any specific physical assets to join the pro-
gramme. Even though the programmes have a low fre-
quency of transactions, the level of TCs is not high due
to this factor since transactions are not very compli-
cated. Moreover, farmers have already learned how such
programmes are implemented given the history of simi-
lar programmes in the study area.
4The average exchange rate in 2012 is USD 1= VND 20,899 (Vi-
etcom Bank).
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Table 3: Farmers’ transaction costs and benefits from forest plantation programmes (in thousand VND/household/contract)
Category
Programme 747 (n=114) Programme 661 (n=48) Both programmes (n=162)
Mean % fixed cost Mean % fixed cost Mean % fixed cost






































































Note: Standard deviations are shown in parenthesis and n is the number of observations.
Even though the focus of the study is on individ-
ual household TCs, we also discuss the differences in
TCs between individual- and community-based partici-
pation based on a literature review and interviews with
key stakeholders. Our results reveal that search and in-
formation costs account for less than one-third of total
TCs. Compared to the case of community forest man-
agement, search and information costs are usually in-
curred in community meetings at an early stage of the
process and are largely fixed. These costs include costs
associated with identification, negotiation with potential
members, formation of groups, gathering information
about the physical attributes of resources, demarcation
of resources and capacity building (Adhikari & Lovett,
2006). TCs from seeking information regarding poten-
tial members may be high (McDowell & Voelker, 2008).
For example, group establishment in a PES-like scheme
in Indonesia ranks high in TC components as observed
by Arifin (2006). Similar findings are reported by some
leaders of community-based forest management in Hoa
Binh province. Locating willing and trustworthy mem-
bers is time consuming. On the other hand, individ-
ual participants have the advantage of not having to go
through such processes. In addition, Meshack et al.
(2006) report that spending a lot of time in meetings is
typical of community-based forest management. While
individual participants in Hoa Binh spend some time in
meetings with implementing officers, community-based
participants require more time in meetings with group
members. TCs from monitoring and enforcement are
the greatest TC for both programmes, accounting for
almost half of all TCs. Thus, the extent of farmer in-
volvement is less important in the process of informa-
tion receiving and decision making compared to moni-
toring activities. Compared to the case of community-
based forest management, community-based manage-
ment schemes have the option of delegating and rotat-
ing labour for planned activities. The larger the group,
the more participants are able to divide labour and time.
Individual participants do not have this option, which in-
creases their TCs. However, conflicts and rule violations
among members are inherent in group- or community-
based systems. In Hoa Binh province, these activities
consume a considerable amount of time and resources
for households participating in community-based pro-
grammes. Low level of trust among villagers in our
study area may also contribute to higher level of TCs
in the case of community-based management, especially
for controlling conflicts and rule violations among mem-
bers. Community-based forest management may lower
A. Manasboonphempool et al. / J. Agr. Rural Develop. Trop. Subtrop. 116 - 2 (2015) 199–211 207
TCs incurred by the buyer or government, but a large
portion of these costs is transferred to and taken up by
members of the community or groups. Such a transfer is
cost-efficient (i.e., it reduces the sum of transaction costs
incurred by principal and agents) if the local group has
information advantages over the principal, i.e., the buyer
of the environmental service. This has been argued by
Zeller (1998) and Sharma & Zeller (1997) for the case
of microfinance institutions that transfer the functions
of screening and monitoring borrowers to local solidar-
ity credit groups who take out loans under joint liability
for repayment of the group loan.
In individual participation, nearly 70 % of total TCs
arise from fixed costs. Variable costs consist of monitor-
ing and enforcement. Monitoring costs amount to about
three-quarters of these variable costs. Comparing the
two programmes, there is no significant difference in to-
tal or per hectare TCs. However, the monitoring costs of
Programme 747 are higher than that of Programme 661.
All other costs are not significantly different from one
another between the two programmes, indicating that
transactions prior to contract signing are more or less the
same for both programmes. The higher monitoring and
enforcement costs of Programme 747 reflect its higher
frequency of cash transfers to participants. The average
benefit from the programmes, which is the sum of cash
given as compensation and the value of tree seedlings, is
about 2.27 million VND (USD 108.7) per household per
contract. At the individual household level, TCs account
for, on average, about one-third of the benefits received
from the programmes.5 This is rather high compared
to similar programmes. For example, the share of pri-
vate TCs per compensation is just 4.5 to 5 % in a direct
payment scheme to farmers for ecological compensation
in Switzerland (Buchli & Flury, 2005). For other agri-
environment programmes in Europe, this share ranges
from 12 % to 25.4 % (cf. Kumm & Drake, 1998 cited in
Falconer, 2000; Rørstad et al., 2007; Falconer & Saun-
ders, 2002; Mettepenningen et al., 2009). This can be
explained by the fact that the monetary benefits from the
two programmes examined in our study are relatively
low compared to the agro-environmental programmes in
developed countries.
4.2 Determinants of household transaction costs
Table 4 presents the coefficient estimates of the
regression analysis. Diagnostics of multicollinearity
5This value is calculated by taking mean TCs per benefit at the
household level. This emphasises the importance of the differences
between households. In addition, this value may not be equivalent to
taking the ratio between mean total TCs and mean programme benefits
from Table 3, which considered mean TCs per benefits for the entire
sample.
among explanatory variables indicate that there is no
collinearity problem since the largest variance inflation
factor (VIF) of all variables is less than 10 (Kutner et al.,
2005) and the condition number is 23.7, which is less
than the cut-off value of 30 (Belsley et al., 2005). The
sensitivity analysis of varying conversion factors is con-
ducted for all the models and the results are consistent,
implying that the results from the regression analysis are
robust.6 For total TCs, the duration of residence is nega-
tive and significant, indicating that households that have
had a longer residence in the village are less active in
participating in the administrative process. This does
not support our hypothesis and is contrary to a previ-
ous study (Mburu et al., 2003) since we had expected
that household heads of such households would be more
involved in meetings used to disseminate information
about the programmes. However, further examination
into different TC components reveals a higher magni-
tude of the coefficient on application costs. This means
that longer established households spend less time in
the application procedure. This result may be driven
by improved access to information that households with
longer residence have. The significant and negative co-
efficient on search costs indicates that such households
spend less time in meetings to gather the same amount
of information compared to newer households who are
less embedded in the political gossip of the village and
have less information from key informants. Longer es-
tablished households also spend less time for monitor-
ing and enforcement activities.
Other than the length of the household’s presence in
the village, there are some other interesting results from
the regression analysis. Education is positive and sig-
nificant for search and application costs, which supports
our hypothesis that more educated households are more
active in taking up the role of disseminating information
and helping clarify regulations or technical explanations
to others. Gender is negative and significant, rejecting
our hypothesis that female household heads have less
time to participate. This can be explained by the fact that
most female headed households in our study area are
single parent households where the husbands are absent
or working somewhere outside the village. Therefore
the female household heads need to spend more time in
transactions due to the lack of experience in participat-
ing in such programmes or other types of social wel-
6The conversion factor for villages close to the district center is
equal to one, whereas differences in conversion factors for remote vil-
lages with good and poor road range from 0.1 to 0.8. In other words, a
series of all the conversion factors would be (1, 0.9, 0.8), (1, 0.8, 0.7),
. . ., and (1, 0.9, 0.1). In total there are 36 cases of different conversion
factors in the sensitivity analysis.
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Table 4: Estimated coefficients from ordinary least square regression analysis
Variable
Coefficient estimate
Total TCs Search and infomation TCs Application TCs Monitoring TCs
Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value
RESIDENCE –0.0171 ∗∗∗ 0.001 –0.0098 ∗ 0.056 –0.0182 ∗∗∗ 0.003 –0.0089 ∗ 0.094
EDUC 0.4899 ∗∗∗ 0.001 0.4022 ∗∗∗ 0.005 0.4974 ∗∗∗ 0.003 0.2094 0.156
MALEHEAD –0.8070 ∗∗∗ 0.007 –0.3912 0.183 –0.5342 0.134 –0.4266 0.156
ACTIVES 0.0235 0.678 0.0003 0.996 0.0623 0.337 –0.0009 0.987
INCOMEPC –4.82e-06 0.614 –8.97e-06 0.412 –0.00001 0.304 4.35e-06 0.655
MEMORG –0.0445 0.342 –0.0280 0.599 –0.0136 0.801 –0.0437 0.363
TRUST 0.0214 0.873 –0.2392 0.122 0.2129 0.169 0.0720 0.597
FORESTAREA 0.00002 ∗∗ 0.050 1.29e-06 0.915 0.00001 0.240 0.00002∗∗ 0.048
FORESTAREASQ –1.95e-10 0.226 –8.75e-11 0.635 –4.02e-11 0.826 –1.82e-10 0.263
DISTANCE –0.0016 0.396 –0.0032 0.139 –0.0012 0.566 0.0014 0.484
REDBOOK –0.1394 0.305 –0.1000 0.521 –0.0162 0.917 –0.1391 0.322
BENEFICIAL 0.4936 ∗∗ 0.050 0.3373 0.238 0.2099 0.460 0.9803∗∗∗ 0.001
PROG747 0.1571 0.300 –0.0704 0.687 0.1262 0.466 0.3482∗∗ 0.027
constant 5.5134 ∗∗∗ 0.000 4.9570 ∗∗∗ 0.000 3.8846 ∗∗∗ 0.000 3.8455 ∗∗∗ 0.000
Observations 166 164 164 163
F-statistic 2.83 ∗∗∗ 1.77 ∗ 2.02 ∗∗ 2.25 ∗∗∗
R-squared 0.1946 0.1330 0.1489 0.1639
Source: Own calculations.
Note: ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ and ∗ indicates significance at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % of error probability, respectively; different number of observations
among models results from zero values being dropped under the process of log transformation; coeff.= coefficient.
fare supports. The area of planted forest is positive and
significant for total TCs and monitoring costs, imply-
ing that time spent on monitoring outcomes or enforcing
regulations does depend on the size of the planted area.
The square of forest area is not significant. Therefore,
the nature of the fixed cost effect could not be measured.
Farmers’ perception that the programme is beneficial is
positive and significant, suggesting that greater expecta-
tions of benefiting from the programme encourage farm-
ers to participate more, especially for monitoring and
enforcement activities. This implies that farmers with
greater expectation on the benefits of the program tend
to spend more time on monitoring activities which influ-
ence the compensation they would receive. Participating
in Programme 747 is found to incur higher monitoring
costs compared to participating in Programme 661 due
to its longer period of implementation and more rounds
of compensation payments.
However, we cannot find significant results from
other relevant variables. Labour availability and income
per capita are not significant, implying that farmers’
time spent participating in the programme may not be
large enough to largely affect their work schedule and
income. Both social capital indicators are not statis-
tically significant, which may be explained by the na-
ture of the programmes which require a low level of co-
management from farmers. In addition, since there is a
low incidence of conflict among participants in the pro-
grammes, the role of social capital in resolving conflicts
is presumably of lower importance. The distance vari-
able is also not significant, indicating that differences in
the distance from the household to the forest plots are
not high enough to generate differences in TCs. Land
tenure security is not significant. The insignificant re-
sult might be caused by the fact that some households
who do not have a Redbook for their land may join the
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programme with the hope and expectation that they may
receive the Redbook by participating in the programme.
5 Conclusions
This study has aimed to measure the level and impor-
tance of TCs incurred by households who participated in
two major forest plantation programmes in northwest-
ern Vietnam. Measuring actual TCs is helpful to under-
stand whether TCs could potentially act as a constraint
to programme participation. Our study has contributed
to the knowledge on TCs borne by households in devel-
oping countries, since there are only a handful of stud-
ies that have empirically analysed actual TCs. The re-
sults found that monitoring and enforcement costs are
higher than information searching and application activ-
ity costs. Average TCs are about 200,000 VND (USD
10) per household per contract, which is equivalent to
about two days of wage labour. Thus, TCs are not likely
to be a constraint for participation in forest manage-
ment programmes such as PES, given the same level
of farmer involvement and monitoring mechanisms in
past programmes. The relatively low TCs are also re-
flected by the programme’s low level of asset specificity.
It is expected that farmers will bear higher TCs from
PES schemes due to greater programme complexity and
longer periods of implementation.
We found a large variation in TCs among households,
but there is no evidence that poorer farmers bear the bur-
den of TCs more than wealthier farmers. Even though
the absolute value of TCs is low, the share of TCs to
programme benefits is 35.7 %, which is relatively high
compared to similar yet more complex programmes in
developed countries. This implies that the payout ratio
of the programmes is quite low and could be increased
for the programmes to be more widely adopted and to
have better efficiency. Hence, rather than aiming to re-
duce TCs, balancing the level of TCs with benefits to
enhance the overall attractiveness of afforestation pro-
grammes for smallholder farmers is considered to be a
more appropriate agenda for policy improvement.
Our regression analysis on the determinants of total
TCs and their components reveals interesting results,
even though there are several insignificant and unex-
pected findings. The results support the argument from a
previous study (Mburu et al., 2003) that factors influenc-
ing the level of private TCs depend on local conditions.
The case study of forest plantation programmes under-
scores the importance of analysing how programmes are
actually implemented when identifying determinants of
private TCs. The findings on separate components of
TCs provide insight into how TCs are linked to differ-
ent activities within the programmes. The household
head’s education, gender and perception towards the
programmes have large effects on the magnitude of TCs.
Strengthening social capital may not be effective in in-
fluencing the level of TCs if the programme is based
on a top-down approach with less collaboration from
participants regarding programme implementation and
where there is no significant conflict among participants
and authorities. Land tenure security does not impact
the level of TCs. This may be due to the local con-
text as well as historical events within the villages and
area, which may influence perceptions relevant to pro-
gramme participation and land ownership. The policy
design process should give particular attention to trade-
offs between strict monitoring and enforcement mecha-
nisms and the level of TCs incurred by farmers.
Although it was not possible to empirically mea-
sure TCs of farmers engaged in community-based for-
est management, our study identifies possible lower
transaction cost and cost effectiveness in group activi-
ties. Implications from this study could be further de-
veloped by expanding the survey and gathering data
from participants in community-based forest manage-
ment programmes. Further research on the compari-
son of TCs associated with community- and individual-
based management systems will have significant impli-
cations for managing PES programmes and providing
more insight on the growing bias towards community-
based systems.
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